Does the Violence Against Women Act
Do Violence to the Limits of
Congressional Power?
INTRODUCTION

When the verdict came down just after 10 o 'clock
Tuesday morning, politicians canceled news conferences
in Washington, President Clinton interrupted a meeting,
stockbrokers stopped trading and long-distance phone
calls dropped dramatically. Nearly all eyes turned to an
image coming from a lone television camera mounted on
the wall of a paneled courtroom in Downtown Los
Angeles where the strange and disquieting case of the
People vs. Orenthal J. Simpson was about to come to a
resounding and startling conclusion. After less than four
hours of deliberations, the jury dispatched the fruit of 133
days of testimony and acquitted the football-star-turnedactor in the murder of his former wife, Nicole Brown
Simpson, and her friend, Ronald Goldman. 1
Amid the chaos outside the Los Angeles Criminal
Courts Building on Tuesday, a small-boned, blond woman
stood quietly at the curb, weeping behind dark glasses.
The woman, Deborah Plewniak, explained that she could
not stay put at her job after the verdict was read, that she
had lived with an abusive husband for eight years and
now counseled victims of domestic violence. "I don ~
understand," the 36-year-old woman said plaintively as a
crush of celebrants swirled around her, rejoicing in a
lightning verdict that set O.J. Simpson free. "I feel like we

1. The Verdict Is In: A City Divided; The Simpson trial has raised questions of
police propriety and racial antipathy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Bl.
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are so unevolved. We need to deal with domestic violence
in this country. "2
On the other side of town, another woman of
similar sentiment fought back tears. "I want to cry, but
I'm holding it back, " said Kathryn Davis-Finch, an
African American graduate student at Loyola Marymount
University, who had come with her classmates to tour the
Museum of Tolerance, a visit that was postponed after the
verdict. "I am feeling so powerless, " continued DavisFinch, who is studying to be an art therapist. "This
outcome speaks to our oppression. How do we get justice
as women?" The laments of these two women echoed
around Los Angeles and across America as victims of
domestic violence and their advocates pondered the end
of a trial that had brought a bonanza of attention to their
cause but ended with stunning repudiation. 3

Ms. Davis-Finch's question, "How do we get justice as women?," had
been considered by Congress back in 1990 when Senator Joseph Biden
submitted a report to the Senate proposing the Violence Against Women
Act ("VAWA"). 4 To ensure justice for women, this Act created five
Titles directed at safe streets for women, safe homes for women, civil
rights for women, safe campuses for women, and equal justice for
women in the courts. 5 It took four years for the Act to become law,
finally passing as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.6 To combat violence against women, the VAWA
provides two new weapons: a federal criminal action for interstate
domestic violence7 and a civil rights cause of action for victims of
crime motivated by gender. 8
On Tuesday, May 23, 1995, Christopher Bailey became the first man
to be convicted under the new interstate domestic violence law. 9 For

2. Jane Gross & Sheryl Stolberg, The Simpson Verdicts; Activists Lament Verdict
but Applaud Focus on Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al.
3. Id.
4. s. REP. No. 101-545, at I (1990).
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. I 03-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as scattered sections of 8, 18,
and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
7. 18 u.s.c. § 2261 (1994).
8. 42 u.s.c. § 13981 (1994).
9. Grisly Beating Case Yields First Conviction Under New U.S. Law, L.A. TIMES,
May 24, 1995, at A20 [hereinafter Grisly Beating Case].
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beating his wife bloody and driving aimlessly across West Virginia and
Kentucky for six days while she remained locked in the trunk, Mr.
Bailey received the maximum twenty-year penalty. 10 Had Bailey been
prosecuted under West Virginia state laws, he would have faced only a
malicious wounding charge that carries a maximum of ten years in
prison. 11 This interstate domestic violence law has subsequently been
challenged as unconstitutional. 12
By 1995, only one case mentioned the civil rights action for victims
of violent crime motivated by gender. 13 Unfortunately, the claim in
that case was denied because the court found that the statute could not
be applied retroactively. 14 Such procedural dismissals will not prevent
future attempts to rely on this new civil rights statute. In fact, a 1995
suit has been initiated by Christy Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia
Polytechnic and State University, who was allegedly raped by two
freshman football players. 15 Brzonkala filed an $8.3 million claim
against the two students and the university for the deprivation of her
civil rights by this crime against women and for sex discrimination by
the university's handling of sexual assault complaints through its internal
judicial process. 16
David Paxton, attorney for one of the alleged rapists, submitted a brief
which argued that Congress exceeded its authority in passing the
Violence Against Women Act, and that sexual abuse is not covered by
the Constitution's Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. 17
In response to this, on March 27, 1996, the Justice Department
announced that it would intervene in Christy Brzonkala's lawsuit to

l 0. Man Convicted Under Domestic Violence Act Given Life Term, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 1995, at A4.
11. Grisley Beating Case, supra note 9, at A20.
12. See United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See infra
Part X.A for a discussion of the Gluzman case.
13. Doe v. Abbott Lab., 892 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. La. 1995).
14. Id.
15. Nina Bernstein, Rape at Root ofStudent's Federal Suit: Woman Claims School
Protected Its Athletes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 11, 1996, at All. See also
Richard Jerome et al., No Justice, No Peace, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Mar. 11, 1996, at 42.
16. Bernstein, supra note 15, at All. Ms. Brzonkala contended that "Virginia
Tech subverted its confidential judicial process to put [her] at a disadvantage for the
benefit of its male football team, in violation of Title IX laws that bar sex discrimination
in schools accepting federal money." Id.
17. Joe Davidson, U.S. to Defend Law on Violence Against Women, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 27, 1996, at B7.
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defend the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act. 18 The
Justice Department and the U.S. Attorney's Office subsequently appeared
as amicus curiae before the Western District of Virginia in support of
Brzonkala's lawsuit. 19 Other challenges have since been levied against
the civil rights statute as well. 20
These federal criminal and civil rights causes of action would probably
be unremarkable if not for the fact that in June 1995, the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision in United States v. Lopez,21
which invalidated a federal law prohibiting firearms within 1,000 feet of
a school zone. According to the Lopez, Congress still has the power to
regulate anything that "substantially affects" interstate commerce under
the Commerce Clause.22 The Commerce Clause states that "The
Congress shall have the Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."23
However, in Lopez, Congress' justification that gun possession in school
zones affects interstate commerce was apparently an illegitimate exercise
of congressional power. 24
Because Congress relied on the Commerce Clause to enact the
interstate domestic violence and the civil rights for women laws, the
purpose of this Comment is to explore, in light of Lopez, whether
Congress was legitimately exercising its commerce power. Also,
because Congress additionally relied on its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the civil rights cause of action for
victims of violence motivated by gender, this Comment asks whether
Congress was acting appropriately to secure the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of equal protection under the law. 25

18. Id.
19. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D.
Va. 1996); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D.
Va. 1996). See infra Part X.C for a discussion of the Brzonkala case.
20. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). See infra Part X.B for
a discussion of the Doe case.
21. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
22. Id. at 558-59. "Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. (citations omitted).
23. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. "To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the States." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
25. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. "The Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, § 5.
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Parts I and II of this Comment discuss these statutes and their
legislative history. Part ill examines how the interstate domestic
violence statute fits in with the history of Congress' power to enact
federal crimes under the Commerce Clause. Part IV examines the
origins of Congress' power to enact civil rights legislation based on the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and how
the civil right to be free from violence motivated by gender comports
with that power. Part V examines United States v. Lopez and its
implications. Part VI examines how United States v. Lopez has been
treated in the lower courts when used to challenge the constitutionality
of statutes concerning gun possession, carjacking, abortion clinic access,
and child support. Parts VII and vm apply Lopez to the interstate
domestic violence and civil rights for women statutes. Part IX concludes
that the interstate domestic violence statute remains constitutional, but
questions the validity of the civil rights for women statute. Part X
summarizes recent cases involving these statutes that were decided after
this comment was written.
I.

THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT - INTERSTATE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

18 U.S.C. § 2261 makes it a crime to cross state lines and commit
violent acts against a spouse or intimate partner. 26 As such, the statute

26. 18 u.s.c. § 2261 (1994):
§ 2261. INTERSTATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(a) Offenses.(1) Crossing a State line.-A person who travels across a State line or
enters or leaves Indian country with the intent to injure, harass, or
intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the course
of or as a result of such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence
and thereby causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner, shall
be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(2) Causing the crossing of a State line.-A person who causes a
spouse or intimate partner to cross a State line or to enter or leave
Indian country by force, coercion, duress, or fraud and, in the course
or as a result of that conduct, intentionally commits a crime of
violence and thereby causes bodily injury to the person's spouse or
intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Penalties.-A person who violates this section shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned(I) for life or any term of years, if death of the offender's spouse or
intimate partner results;
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itself contains the express jurisdictional requirement of crossing a state
line, which ensures, on a case-by-case basis, a nexus with interstate
travel. Although the statute otherwise claims no underlying authority for
its passage, congressional hearings refer to the Commerce Clause:
"Congress' power over interstate commerce of course allows it to
regulate interstate crimes."27
Moreover, although congressional
findings for the Violence Against Women Act do not contain specific
data on how domestic violence affects interstate commerce, Senator
Biden quoted the following statistics:
Our society pays a heavy price for this violence: l million [women] a year seek
medical attention for injuries caused by violence at the hand of a male partner;
children in homes with family violence are 15 times more likely to be abused
or neglected than children in peaceful homes; and finally, estimates suggest that
we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health care, criminal justice, and other
social costs of domestic violence. Indeed, for the past 4 years, the U.S.
Surgeons General have warned that family violence-not heart attacks or cancer
or strokes-poses the single largest threat of injury to adult women in this
country. 28

Because ''women constitute 50% of the nation's labor force," 29 there is
certainly an inferential argument that domestic violence, in the aggregate,
affects interstate commerce. Further, Congress could apply to the
interstate domestic violence statute its numerous findings on genderbased vio lence, which were used to support its jurisdictional authority
for the civil rights remedy,30 discussed in the following section.

(2) for not more than 20 years if permanent disfigurement or life
threatening bodily injury to the offender's spouse or intimate partner
results;
(3) for not more than 10 years, if serious bodily injury to the
offender's spouse or intimate partner results or if the offender uses a
dangerous weapon during the offense;
(4) as provided for the applicable conduct under chapter 109A if the
offense would constitute an offense under chapter 109A (without
regard to whether the offense was committed in the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison);
and
(5) for not more than 5 years, in any other case, or both fined and
imprisoned.
27. Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing on H.R. 1133 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House ofRepresentatives Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1993) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Law
Professor, University of Chicago) [hereinafter Crimes of Violence].
28. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
29. Crimes of Violence, supra note 27, at 43 (statement of Burt Neubome, Law
Professor, New York University).
30. See infra Part II.
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II. THE

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT-CIVIL
RIGHTS FOR WOMEN

42 U.S.C. § 13981 31 creates the first federal civil rights remedy for

31. 42 u.s.c. § 13981 (1994):
§ 13981. Civil rights
(a) Purpose
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as
under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this
part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence
and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate
commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for
victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence
All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d) of
this section).
(c) Cause of action
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a
crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the
right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the
party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief
as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section-(I) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime
of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,
and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender;
and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means--(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against
the person or that would constitute a felony against property if the
conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and
that would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses
described in section 16 of Title 18, whether or not those acts have
actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and
whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime,
territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony
described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the
person who takes such action and the individual against whom such
action is taken.
(e) Limitation and procedures
( 1) Limitation
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gender-based violent crime, allowing any victim of such crime to bring
a civil action against her attacker in federal court for damages and other
relief. 32 In what situations can this new remedy be used? There must
be a violent felony "motivated by gender," which is to say that a woman
"must demonstrate that the defendant attacked her because she is a
woman and that the attacker was motivated, at least in part, by her
gender."33 Senator Biden cites an example of how a woman could
show such gender-motivated violence: "[A] defendant entered a
department store carrying a gun, picked out women in the store and shot
her while screaming anti-women epithets, and leaving the many nearby
men unharmed."34 However, verbal expressions of bias are not
mandatory; the attacker may demonstrate bias by his actions alone. 35
Because the above explanation is somewhat general, perhaps it would
be useful to explore this civil rights remedy in terms of rape, a horrible
form of violence against women. According to Senate Report 103-138,
"Title III does not create a general Federal law for all assaults or rapes
against women."36 Rather, "[d]iscriminatory motivation is clearly
required . . . and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving . . . that the
crime of violence--whether an assault, a kidnapping, or a rape--was

Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under
subsection (c) of this section for random acts of violence unrelated
to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender (within the
meaning of subsection (d) of this section).
(2) No prior criminal action
Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action
under subsection (c) of this section
(3) Concurrent jurisdiction
The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over
actions brought pursuant to this part.
(4) Supplemental jurisdiction
Neither section 1367 of title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section
shall be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such
subsection, to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction
over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce,
alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody
decree.
32. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 48 (1993).
33. Id. at 50-51. This remedy is "intended to apply primarily against individuals;"
it "does not permit suits against a municipality simply because the government employed
an individual who committed a gender motivated crime;" nor does it "permit damage
suits against a State or a State official acting in his official capacity;" nor does it "permit
a claim on the grounds that a governmental entity has violated a citizen's due process
rights by failing to protect him or her." Id. at 53.
34. Id. at 51.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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motivated by gender."37 As far as proof requirements, "[j]udges and
juries will determine 'motivation' from the 'totality of the circumstances'
surrounding the event. " 38 Thus to prove that rape was motivated by
gender animus, several factors can be considered:
Consider the case of a serial rapist who shouts misogynist slurs as he attacks
his victims. A victim's lawyer would prove ... that the victim was of a
particular sex; that the attacker had a long history of attacking persons of that
sex, but not those of the opposite sex; and that the attacker shouted antiwoman
(or man) epithets during the assault. Bias, in short, can be proven by
circumstantial evidence as well as indirect evidence. Again, the jury might not
be convinced by any one of these circumstances individually-but could conclude
that, taken together, they show gender bias. 39

In Senate Report 103-138, Senator Biden analogized this civil rights
remedy to protect women against gender-based violence to 42 U.S.C.
§ 2OOOe, which bars gender discrimination in the workplace. 40 Senator
Biden also noted that traditional civil rights remedies against violent
discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin, have been
largely unavailable to victims of gender-based attacks. 41 Further, "[i]n
the past ten years, almost every state has passed laws that increase civil
penalties, some of which also provide civil remedies for the victims of
hate crimes, but less than a dozen cover gender bias.',42 As such, it has
been asserted that state remedies are inadequate to protect women from
gender-based violence. 43
Upon closer inspection of this new civil rights law, one must ask:
"Does Congress have the Constitutional power to enact this law?" As
stated in the statute, Congress has the affirmative power to enact this
legislation "under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution.',44 This specific authority was included in this section "in order
37. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993).
38. Id. at 52.
39. Id.
40. Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, tenns, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)
(1994).
41. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52 (1993).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 49.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1398l(a) (1994).
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to make clearer the connection between [the civil rights remedy] and
Congress' enumerated powers," to ensure that "this provision is in all
likelihood constitutional.',45 Most of the letters and statements submitted for the House Judiciary Committee's hearing on November 16, 1993
supported Congress' power to enact this legislation. 46 Generally, these
sources found that because the cumulative effect of gender-based
violence affects interstate commerce, Congress could pass this law based
on its Commerce Clause authority. Furthermore, those consulted by the
House Judiciary Committee also considered there to be a constitutional
violation consisting of "bias or discrimination in the administration of
the criminal justice system-in the form of a refusal to deal adequately
with crime against women. " 47
More specifically, at the time this civil rights remedy was enacted,
Congress viewed the Commerce Clause as "a broad grant of power
allowing Congress to reach conduct that has even the slightest effect on
interstate commerce."48 As such, Congress could justifiably enact this
remedy:
Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement,
reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces
consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national
economy. Gender-based violence bars its most likely targets-women--from
full [participation] in the national economy. For example, studies report that
almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to quit in the
aftermath of the crime. Even the fear of gender-based violence affects the
economy because it deters women from taking jobs in certain areas or at certain
hours that pose a significant risk of such violence. 49

Thus, a remedy for gender-based violent crime was believed to meet the
"modest threshold required by the Commerce Clause."50
Next, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
considered this civil rights remedy as "appropriate" for two reasons:
"[F]irst, it attacks gender-motivated crimes that threaten women's equal

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Crimes of Violence, supra note 27, at 57.
See generally, Crimes of Violence, supra note 27.
Id. at 65.
s. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993).
Id.
The facts before the Committee-emphasizing enormous levels of sex
related violence, and the recent increase in that form of criminality-<:ould
reasonably justify the conclusion that the interstate market is adversely
affected. The adverse effects might include a decrease in goods and services,
diminished employee productivity, increased medical costs, and decreases both
in the supply of and demand for interstate products.
Crimes of Violence, supra note 27, at 61 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Law Professor,
University of Chicago).
50. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 54.
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protection of the laws; second, it provides a necessary remedy to fill the
gap and rectify the biases of existing State laws."51 Under the first
justification, "a civil action in Federal court-by a victim of genderbased violent crime against his or her attacker ... [is the] kind of
private action that has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court as
appropriate to remedy violent discrimination."52 With regard to the
second justification:
Under the 14th amendment, there is no clearer case of Congress's power to
legislate than when States have failed to protect equal rights .... [I]n many
States rape survivors must overcome barriers of proof and local prejudice that
other crime victims need not hurdle: they bear the burden of painful and
prejudicial attacks on their credibility that other crime victims do not shoulder;
they may be forced to expose their private lives and intimate conduct to win a
damage award; and finally, in some cases, they may be barred from suit
altogether by tort immunity doctrines or marital exemptions. 53

Thus, Congress sought to remedy a constitutional violation consisting of
"bias or discrimination in the administration of the criminal justice
system-in the form of a refusal to deal adequately with crimes against
women, in part because the victims in the relevant cases are women." 54
What sort of statistics are available to show discrimination in the
administration of state criminal justice systems? The Senate Judiciary
Committee sent requests to State criminal justice analysis centers in all
fifty states for data on murder, assault, kidnapping, child abuse and
rape. 55 A summary of their findings is thus:
Ninety-eight percent of rape victims will never see their attacker apprehended, convicted, and incarcerated;
Over half (54 percent) of all rape prosecutions result in either a dismissal or
an acquittal;
A rape prosecution is more than twice as likely as a murder prosecution to
be dismissed and 30 percent more likely to be dismissed than a robbery
prosecution;

51. Id.at55.
52. Id. (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966); and District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973)). For a
discussion on the private actions sanctioned by the Supreme Court as appropriate to
remedy violent discrimination, see infra Part IV.D.
53. Id.
54. Crimes of Violence, supra note 27, at 65.
55. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., THE
RESPONSE To RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE 23 (Comm. Print
1993).
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Approximately 1 in 10 rapes reported to the police results in time served in
prison; 1 in 100 rapes (including those that go unreported) is sentenced to more
than 1 year in prison;
Almost one-quarter of convicted rapists are not sentenced to prison but,
instead, are released on probation;
Nearly one-quarter of convicted rapists receives a sentence to a local jail for only 11 months (according to national estimates);
Adding together the convicted rapists sentenced to probation and those
sentenced to local jails, almost halfofall convicted rapists are sentenced to less
than I year behind bars. 56

Why do the statistics show less convictions and less severe punishment
for rape? The Staff Report offered several reasons, ranging from nonreporting of rape, to police officers not arresting for "unfounded" rape
charges, to prosecutors' reluctance to bring any case where the offender
knew the victim, to jury acquittals based on stereotypical attitudes, and
lastly to judges' discretion to impose lesser sentences. 57 Other Congressional reports have also included anecdotal evidence which
demonstrate how crimes against women are treated less seriously than
other violent crimes:
In Georgia, a judge reported that one of his colleagues, in a case of repeated
domestic abuse, "mocked," "humiliated," and ''ridiculed" the victim and "led
the courtroom in laughter as the woman left ..." Subsequently, the woman
was killed by her estranged husband.
In Vermont, a probation officer questioned whether a 9-year-old girl was a
"real victim," since he had heard she was a "tramp."
In California, a judge commented at a hearing that a domestic violence
victim "probably should have been hit."
A Connecticut prosecutor badgered a 15-year-old: "Come on, you can tell
me. You're probably just worried that your boyfriend got you pregnant, right?
Isn't that why you're saying he raped you?"
A Florida judge commented during sentencing that he felt sorry for a
confessed rapist because his victim was such a "pathetic" woman.
A Georgia detective investigating a rape told the victim's mother that since
the 14-year-old said "no" only once, it might not be considered a rape.
In Maryland, a judge stated in court that he didn't believe anything that the
abuse victim was saying "because I don't believe that anything like this could
happen to me. " 58

Such stories emphasize why Congress found equal protection violations
by state criminal justice systems on the basis of the states' failure to
adequately deal with violence against women.

56.
57.
58.
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Ill. CRIMES AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In order to address the constitutionality of the interstate domestic
violence statute, it is necessary to briefly examine the history of federal
crimes based on the Commerce Clause. As a starting point, Congress
not only has the "inherent power to establish criminal penalties for
actions that interfere with any federal interest,"59 it can also use the
Commerce Clause to enact general criminal laws.60 Most notably, this
power has been used to prohibit "interstate transportation incident to
some other crime.',6 1 For example, the Supreme Court upheld
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to criminalize the
transportation of lottery tickets from one state to another; 62 to prohibit
the interstate transportation of women for prostitution purposes;63 and
to punish the interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles.64
The federalization of criminal laws progressed in the 1930s when
Congress enacted the Lindbergh Act65 (prohibiting the transportation of
a kidnapped victim across state lines), the Fugitive Felon Act66
(prohibiting interstate flight to avoid prosecution for enumerated violent
felonies), the National Firearms Act67 (regulating the sale of guns), and

59.
1991).

JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTIJNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 165 (4th ed.

Thus, Congress may establish crimes related to any action taken on federal
lands under its property power, activities relating to interstate communications
under the postal power, the evasion of tax statutes under the taxation power,
or the violation of federal civil rights under the powers granted by certain
amendments to the Constitution.
Id. (citations omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
63. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). See also Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
64. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
65. Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (1994)). See also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936)
(upholding the amending Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 301, 48 Stat. 781 (1934), 18 U.S.C.
408a, which extended "Federal jurisdiction under the act to persons who have been
kidnapped and held, not only for reward, but for any other reason...").
66. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 302, 48 Stat. 782 (1934) (current version at 18
u.s.c. § 1073 (1994)).
67. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (current version at 26
U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. (1994)).
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the National Stolen Property Act68 (prohibiting the transportation of
stolen property in interstate commerce). These laws changed what were
uniquely local concerns into national ones, because crime was now
perceived as an interstate problem beyond the power of states to
effectively address. 69 Clearly, the Supreme Court was willing to
support federal criminal laws based on interstate transportation even
before it adopted the more expansive view of the Commerce power in
1937.70
However, the scope of Congress' power remained limited to situations
having a "nexus" to interstate commerce until Perez v. United States. 71
In Perez, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which criminalized extortionate
credit transactions or loan sharking. 72 The Court noted:
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems.
First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress
deems are being misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods (18
U.S.C. §§ 2312-2315) or of persons who have been kidnapped (18 U.S.C.
§ 120 I). Second, protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as
for example, the destruction ofan aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32), or persons or things
in commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C.
§ 659). Third, those activities affecting commerce. It is with this last category
that we are here concerned. 73

To explain the third category, the Court cited Wicka.rd v. Filburn for the
proposition that:
even if [one's] activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as
"direct" or "indirect". 74

From this, the Court concluded that "[e]xtortionate credit transactions,
though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect
interstate commerce ... [because] there is a tie-in between local loan
sharks and interstate crime."75 That tie-in derived from congressional
:findings that "loan sharking in its national setting is one way organized

68.

Act of May 22, 1943, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794 (1934) (current version at 18

u.s.c. § 2314 (1994)).

69. Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1144 (1995).
70. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at 154-55.
71. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
72. Id.
13. Id. at 150.
14. Id. at 151-52 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
75. Id. at 154-55.
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interstate crime holds its guns to the heads of the poor and the rich alike
and syphons funds from numerous localities to finance its national
operations. " 76
This expansive view has allowed more statutes which criminalize
activities "affecting commerce" such as arson or bombings of "any
building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or
foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce;"77 possession of any firearm or ammunition "in or affecting
commerce" by a felon; 78 carjacking of vehicles that have been "transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce;"79
obstruction of abortion clinics; 80 and failure to pay child support. 81
Currentl'2, many federal courts are hearing Lopez challenges to these
statutes. 2 However, the interstate domestic violence statute parallels
the earlier criminal laws which criminalize an activity combined with
interstate transportation, not an activity that "affects commerce" such as
the loan sharking in Perez. As such, the Supreme Court will probably

76. Id. at 157.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994). See Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862
(1985) (holding that rental of 2-unit apartment building is property that is "used" in an
"activity" that affects commerce).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I) (1994). See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563
( 1977) (holding that proof that a possessed firearm previously traveled at some time in
interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the required nexus between possession and
commerce). For a discussion on the constitutionality of this statute, see infra pp. 39-40.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994). For a discussion on the constitutionality of this
statute, see infra pp. 40-41.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). Although the statute does not include the "affecting
commerce" language, it was alluded to in the session law:
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this legislation under
section 8 of article I of the Constitution, as well as under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, it is the purpose of this Act
[enacting this section and provisions set out as notes under this section] to
protect and promote the public safety and health and activities affecting
interstate commerce by establishing Federal criminal penalties and civil
remedies for certain violent, threatening, obstructive and destructive conduct
that is intended to injure, intimidate or interfere with persons seeking to obtain
or provide reproductive health services.
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat.
694 (1994), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 248 Historical and Statutory Notes (1996)
(Congressional Statement of Purpose). For a discussion on the constitutionality of this
statute, see infra pp. 41-43.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). For a discussion on the constitutionality of this
statute, see infra pp. 43-50.
82. See infra Part VI.

1061

not look favorably on a Lopez challenge to the interstate domestic
violence statute. 83

IV.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENACT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION

As stated in Part II, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 13981 pursuant to
its power under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 84 This section discusses these respective powers as well
as whether the civil right to be free from violent crime motivated by
gender comports with that power.

A.

Civil Rights Laws and the Commerce Clause

The new civil rights statute in the Violence Against Women Act
creates a civil right to be "free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender," or in other words, violent gender discrimination. 85 Congress
believed that this law was a valid exercise of the commerce power
because:
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate,
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of violence
motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce,
by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and
decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products....86

Are these the kind of substantial effects that justify the use of the
commerce power? What are the parameters within which Congress must
work in order to validly exercise the commerce power?
Before 1964, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Interstate Commerce Act87 as a precursor to modem civil rights laws.

83.

See infra Part VII for a discussion of the application of Lopez to 18 U.S.C.

§ 2261.

84. See supra Part II.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
86. 140 CONG. REc. H8871 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) Goint explanatory statement
of the Committee of Conference).
87. Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this
part to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association,
locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or
any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject
any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port,
port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular
description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage
in any respect whatsoever . . . .
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In Mitchell v. United States,88 when a railroad discriminated against
African-American passengers in giving accommodations, the Court found
not only that the discrimination was within the "rurview of the sweeping
prohibitions of the Interstate Commerce Act," 8 but also that Congress
had the "authority to reach" any discriminatory action or practice of
interstate carriers affecting interstate commerce.90
From this, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964 which
prohibited discrimination and segregation based on race, color, religion,
or national origin in places of public accommodation. 91 The statute
defined places of public accommodation that "affect interstate commerce" as establishments which "provide lodging to transient guests";
"facilit[ies] principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises"; "gasoline station[s]"; "place[s] of exhibition or entertainment"; and any other establishments physically located on the prior
mentioned places. 92 The statute explicitly requires a nexus of either
"interstate travelers" or products that have "moved in commerce."93
The Civil Rights Act also defines commerce as "travel, trade, traffic,
commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
States."94 Thus, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court upheld this
law as applied to hotels in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States95 and to restaurants in Katzenbach v. McClung. 96 In Heart of

49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1940), amended by 49 U.S.C. § l074(b)-(d) (1994).
88. 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
89. Id. at 94.
90. Id. See also Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (holding that a
restaurant in a bus terminal violated the Interstate Commerce Act by discriminating
against a black interstate traveler); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950)
(holding that discrimination in railroad dining accommodations violates Interstate
Commerce Act); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (holding that a state statute
requiring segregation of passengers in public motor carriers unlawfully burdened
interstate commerce).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1994).
92. Id.§ 2000a(b). "[A]ny inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides
lodging to transient guests" is automatically considered to "affect interstate commerce."
Id. § 2000a(b)(l). The other enumerated establishments come within the purview of the
statute when "a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other
products which it sells, has moved in commerce." Id. § 2000a(c). It is interesting to
note that under the subsection concerning places of exhibition or entertainment, not only
films "move in commerce," but so do performances and athletic teams. Id.
93. Id. § 2000a(c).
94. Id.
95. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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Atlanta, the Court stated that "the determinative test of the exercise of
power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether
the activity sought to be regulated is 'commerce which concerns more
States than one' and has a real and substantial relation to the national
interest. " 97 The Court cited the definition of commerce in Gibbons v.
Ogden98 approvingly, that commerce is "intercourse,"99 and that this
intercourse "include[s] the movement of persons through more States
than one." 100 Thus, in enacting legislation, Congress has the power to
promote interstate commerce by regulating local activities "which might
have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce." 101 Further,
the Heart of Atlanta Court believed that methods used to eliminate
obstructions found in interstate commerce are:
a matter of policy that rests entirely with the Congress not with the courts.
How obstructions in commerce may be removed-what means are to be
employed-is within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress. It is
subject only to one caveat---that the means chosen by it must be reasonably
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. 102

Thus, a rational basis/minimal scrutiny type review was set out for future
Commerce Clause cases; 103 even though the Civil Rights Act had no
congressional findings on the relationship between racial discrimination
and interstate commerce, congressional hearings provided "overwhelming
evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate
travel." 104
96. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
97. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 255.
98. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
99. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 254.
I 00. Id. at 255-56. The Court also quotes from Caminetti as follows:
The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been
settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause
of the Constitution, and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of
interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently
sustained, and is no longer open to question.
Id. at 256 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)). More
importantly, it does not "make any difference whether the transportation is commercial
in character." Id.
101. Id. at 258.
102. Id. at 261-62.
103. See Katzenbach v. McC!ung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) ("But where we find
that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis
for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end.").
104. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
[T]he overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse . . . empowered Congress to enact
appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power,
Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to
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In Katzenbach v. McC/ung, ,os the Court determined that Congress
had "a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in restaurants
had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce."106 Here, "Congress acted well within its power to protect and
foster commerce in extending the coverage of Title II [of the Civil
Rights Act] only to those restaurants offering to serve interstate travelers
or serving food, a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate
commerce." 107 Thus, it appeared that even if something as minimal as
the food served came from another state, a sufficient tie to interstate
commerce exists for Congress to exercise its regulatory power.
As applied to the civil rights for women statute, it appears that
Congress must have a rational basis to conclude that violent gender
discrimination has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As such,
it would seem rather easy to say that Congress may regulate whatever
it chooses. But the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, was
concerned only with the deterrence of interstate travel by racial
discrimination in public accommodations, and was broadened in scope
by including establishments that serve or sell products that have moved
in interstate commerce. Here, the substantial effects on interstate
commerce are "deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from
engaging in employment in interstate business . . . and . . . diminishing
national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing
the supply of and the demand for interstate products." 108
With potential victims of violent gender discrimination, there has not
been the same kind of racial discrimination in public accommodations
that could be legitimately viewed as deterring interstate travel. It can be
asserted that interstate commerce is displaced because women avoid
certain areas, especially during certain time periods like at night, and that
this does indeed deter interstate travel. However, not only "violent
gender discrimination," but all forms of crime strike fear in the hearts of
women and men. Adopting this rationale would inevitably lead to

interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and
social wrong.
Id. at 257.
105. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
106. Id. at 304.
107. Id.
108. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (joint explanatory
statement of the Committee of Conference).
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federalization of all criminal law, because fear constrains all people from
traveling to certain places at certain times.
Next, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) makes it a federal crime for:
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of
force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with any person because of his race, color, religion or
national origin and because he is or has been . . . applying for or enjoying
employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any private employer or any agency
of any State or subdivision thereof, or joining or using the services or
advantages of any labor organization, hiring hall, or employment agency. 109

On its face, this statute does not apply to interference based on gender.
But even if it did, there is a significant distinction between someone who
willfully interferes with "applying for or enjoying employment,"
compared with the fear that a violent crime motivated by gender will
deter a potential victim "from engaging in employment in interstate
business." The former contemplates an individual actor with discriminatory purpose against another specific individual; the latter focuses on
general fear deterring potential victims.
Decreasing supply and demand of interstate products is also a great
departure from places of public accommodation serving or selling
products that have moved in interstate commerce. The Civil Rights Act
of 1964 expanded its anti-discriminatory reach by including establishments that served or sold goods that moved in commerce. Using a
supply and demand theory to demonstrate a substantial effect on
interstate commerce would place virtually no limit on federal power.
Similarly, if an adequate substantial effect on interstate commerce is
found by looking at the "effects" of an activity that is sought to be
regulated and finding diminished national productivity and increased
medical costs, then such a nebulous standard would allow regulation of
almost any activity, regardless of its effect on commerce. As a result,
when enacting the civil rights for women statute, Congress did not
display a proper substantial effect on interstate commerce.

B.

Congressional Power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment

That the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted through Congress'
commerce power" 0 was probably due to the fact that Section 5 of the

109.
110.
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Fourteenth Amendmentm had been greatly limited by the Civil Rights
Cases of 1883. 112 However, in 1966, six members of the Court
suggested a much broader view of Section 5 in United States v.
Guest. 113 At issue was 18 U.S.C. § 241, which criminalized conspiracy to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State,
Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States." 114 Justices Clark, Black, and Fortas' concurring opinion
adopted the view that "the specific language of Section 5 empowers the
Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies---with or without state
action--that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." 115 Justices
Brennan, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren endorsed this view as
well.116

111. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
112. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
[T]he last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to enforce
it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition.
To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited
State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void, and
innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is
the whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon
subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes
of relief against State legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It
does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the
regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the
operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial,
when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
amendment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against
State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by
power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such
prohibition into effect: and such legislation must necessarily be predicated
upon such supposed State laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the
correction of their operation and effect.
Id. at 11-12.
113. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
114. 18 u.s.c. § 241 (1994).
115. Guest, 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Section] 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to
interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not
state officers or others acting under the color of state law are implicated in the
conspiracy. Although the Fourteenth Amendment itself, according to
established doctrine, 'speaks to the State or to those acting under the color of
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Three months later, Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Katzenbach
v. Morgan, which defined a new standard for congressional power under

Section 5: "Correctly viewed,§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 117 "Appropriate legislation" under section 5 is defined
by whether it "may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause, whether it is 'plainly adapted to that end' and whether
it is not prohibited by but is consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the
constitution. "' 118 Applying this standard, the Court upheld the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 119 which
overrode the enforcement of New York's election laws requiring an
ability to read and write English as a voting requirement. 120
Justice Harlan was highly critical of this new standard, stating that
"[i]n effect the Court reads Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as
giving Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the
Amendment." 121 This sort of "legislative announcement that Congress
believes a state law to entail an unconstitutional deprivation of equal
protection" would abdicate the responsibility of the Supreme Court "to
decide the fundamental issue of whether in fact the state enactment
violates federal constitutional rights." 122 In his view, federal authority,
be it legislative or judicial, should not intrude upon the states "unless

its authority,' legislation protecting rights created by that Amendment, such as
the right to equal utilization of state facilities, need not be confined to
punishing conspiracies in which state officers participate. Rather, § 5
authorizes Congress to make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary
to protect a right created by and arising under that Amendment; and Congress
is thus fully empowered to determine that punishment of private conspiracies
interfering with the exercise of such a right is necessary to its full protection.
Id.
117. 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966).
118. Id.
I 19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(2) (1994). That law stated in pertinent part:
No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth
primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any
State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico in which the predominate classroom language of instruction was other
than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local
election because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any
matter in the English language.
Id.
120.
121.
122.
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there has been a denial by state action of Fourteenth Amendment
limitations." 123
Unsurprisingly, these opposing views were revisited in later decisions.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 124 four Justices agreed with the broad view
announced in Morgan that Congress could pass legislation to remedy
what it deemed to be equal protection violations. 125 However, the
other five justices had a narrower view of the enforcement power of
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment, which established that equal
protection legislation was subject to review by the courts. 126 The

123. Id. at 670 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
124. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
125. "Here we are dealing with the right of Congress to 'enforce' the principles of
equality enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment .... The manner of enforcement
involves discretion; but that discretion is largely entrusted to the Congress, not to the
courts." Id. at 142-43 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that '(t)he Congress shall
have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.'
Should Congress, pursuant to that power, undertake an investigation in order
to determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative
discrimination actually exists, it need not stop once it determines that some
reasonable men could believe the factual basis exists. Section 5 empowers
Congress to make its own determination on the matter.
Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In sum, Congress had ample evidence upon which it could have based the
conclusion that exclusion of citizens 18 to 21 years of age from the franchise
is wholly unnecessary to promote any legitimate interest the States may have
in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. If discrimination is unnecessary
to promote any legitimate state interest, it is plainly unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause, and Congress has ample power to forbid it under s
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We would uphold section 302 of the 1970
Amendments as a legitimate exercise of congressional power.
Id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
126. [T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was never
intended to destroy the States' power to govern themselves, making the
Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments superfluous. My brother Brennan's
opinion, if carried to its logical conclusion, would, under the guise of insuring
equal protection, blot out all state power, leaving the 50 States as little more
than impotent figureheads.
Id. at 126.
As broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.
Specifically, there are at least three limitations upon Congress' power to
enforce the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments. First, Congress may not
by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitution. Second, the power
granted to Congress was not intended to strip the States of their power to
govern themselves or to convert our national government of enumerated
powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over every inch of

1069

uncertainty concerning the scope of congressional power did not end
here.
For example, in City of Rome v. United States, 127 at issue were
electoral changes in Rome which were found not to have a discriminatory purpose, but only a discriminatory effect on African-Americans. The
majority cited Oregon v. Mitchell for the proposition that "Congress
could rationally have determined that these provisions [of the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970] were appropriate methods of attacking
the perpetuation of earlier, purposeful racial discrimination, regardless
of whether the practices they prohibited were discriminatory only in
effect." 128 However, Justice Rehnquist disagreed, stating that "Oregon
by no means held that Congress could simply use discriminatory effect
as a proxy for discriminatory purpose, as the Court seems to imply." 129
Rather, it is simply not "'appropriate' for Congress to attempt to prevent
purposeful discrimination by prohibiting conduct which a locality proves
is not purposeful discrimination." 130

the whole Nation. Third, Congress may only 'enforce' the provisions of the
amendments and may do so only by "appropriate legislation."
Id. at 128.
As the Court is not justified in substituting its own views of wise policy for
the commands of the Constitution, still less is it justified in allowing Congress
to disregard those commands as the Court understands them. Although
Congress' expression of the view that it does have power to alter state suffrage
qualifications is entitled to the most respectful consideration by the judiciary,
coming as it does from a coordinate branch of government, this cannot
displace the duty of this Court to make an independent determination whether
Congress has exceeded its powers .... I cannot agree that the Fourteenth
Amendment empowered Congress, or the federal judiciary, to control voter
qualifications.
Id. at 204 (Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)(footnote omitted).
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Stewart's opinion.
Stewart's view of Morgan was that Congress could impose on the States a remedy for
the denial of equal protection that elaborated upon the direct command of the
Constitution, and that it could override state laws on the ground that they were in fact
used as instruments of invidious discrimination even though a court in an individual
lawsuit might not have reached that factual conclusion. Id. at 296 (Stewart, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, Congress does not have "the power
to determine what are and what are not 'compelling state interests' for equal protection
purposes." Id. at 295 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
128. Id. at 176-77.
129. Id. at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 214.
To permit congressional power to prohibit the conduct challenged in this
case requires state and local governments to cede far more of their powers to
the Federal Government than the Civil War Amendments ever envisioned; and
it requires the judiciary to cede far more of its power to interpret and enforce
the Constitution than ever envisioned. The intrusion is all the more offensive
to our constitutional system when it is recognized that the only values fostered
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Section 5 has also been invoked as a justification for many affirmative
action programs. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, a plurality of the Court
upheld Congress' power under section 5 to enact a statute that required
ten percent of federal funds for local public works projects to be used
to hire businesses owned by statutorily identified minority groups:
"[C]ongressional authority extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful
discrimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory impact
perpetuating the effects of past discrimination." 131 But again, dissenters questioned the extent of Congress' power. 132
The question on affirmative action programs was revisited in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, where the Court held that "all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." 133

are debatable assumptions about political theory which should properly be left
to the local democratic process.
Id. at 221.
131. 448 U.S. 448, 477 (1980). Justice Powell's concurring opinion outlined the
following test for congressional power:
I conclude, therefore, that the Enforcement Clauses of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Congress the authority to select
reasonable remedies to advance the compelling state interest in repairing the
effects of discrimination. But that authority must be exercised in a manner
that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments. The Judicial Branch
has the special responsibility to make a searching inquiry into the justification
for employing a race-conscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the
possibility that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state interest
equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice ofa remedy should be upheld,
however, if the means selected are equitable and reasonably necessary to the
redress of identified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safeguard of judicial
review of racial classifications.
Id. at 510 (Powell, J. concurring).
132. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist, asserted that
[E]ven assuming that Congress has the power, under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . to remedy previous illegal racial discrimination, there is no
evidence that Congress has in the past engaged in racial discrimination in its
disbursement of federal contracting funds. The MBE provision thus pushes the
limits of any such justification far beyond the equal protection standard of the
Constitution. Certainly, nothing in the Constitution gives Congress any greater
authority to impose detriments on the basis of race than is afforded the Judicial
Branch. And a judicial decree that imposes burdens on the basis of race can
be upheld only where its sole purpose is to eradicate the actual effects of
illegal race discrimination.
Id. at 527-28 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
133. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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In Adarand, the Court recognized the continuing divergence of views on
Section 5:
It is true that various Members of this Court have taken different views of
the authority § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal
with the problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which courts should
defer to Congress' exercise of that authority .... We need not, and do not,
address these differences today. For now, it is enough to observe that Justice
Stevens' suggestion that any Member of this Court has repudiated in this case
his or her previously expressed views on the subject ... is incorrect. 134

Regardless of these differing views, the Supreme Court's action in
Adarand "makes explicit what Justice Powell thought implicit in the
Fullilove lead opinion: federal racial classifications, like those of a State,
must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly
tailored to further that interest." 135
Based on the divergence of views on Congress' power under Section
5, it becomes increasingly unclear to what extent Section 5 may be used
to justify legislation enacted by Congress. Congress may not define the
"substantive boundaries of the equal protection clause." 136 However,
it appears that Congress is empowered to identify what it perceives as
equal protection violations and to enact legislation to remedy such
violations, subject to judicial review. The remaining question is where
the Supreme Court draws the line for its standard of review. For racial
classifications, Adarand instructs that strict scrutiny determines that line
when courts review legislation enacted to enforce the "equal protection
of the laws."
In terms of the federal civil right to be free from violence motivated
by gender, Congress has identified an equal protection violation by the
failure of state criminal justice systems to adequately deal with violence
against women. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 was enacted to remedy this
violation. How are the courts to review this legislation? In Craig v.
Boren, the Supreme Court established the rule that "[t]o withstand
constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." 137 Thus for gender classifications,
"intermediate" scrutiny determines how courts shall review legislation
enacted to enforce the "equal protection of the laws." 138

134. Id. at 230-31 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 235.
136. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at 913.
137. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
138. The author is assuming that the "Violence Against Women Act" involves a
gender classification because all of the studies in support of the civil rights statute
involved violence against women. However, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 is gender-neutral on its
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The question in Craig v. Boren was whether an Oklahoma statute that
prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under age
twenty-one and to females under age eighteen violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law. 139 There,
the important governmental objective was the "enhancement of traffic
safety ... [or] protection of public health and safety." 140 However,
statistics used to show the substantial achievement of that objective
revealed that only .18% of females and 2% of males aged eighteen to
twenty-one were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. 141
As such, the Court stated that "if maleness is to serve as a proxy for
drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered an unduly
tenuous 'fit. "' 142 The court further revealed a distaste for utilizing
statistical analyses to show an equal protection violation:
It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to
be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique. But this
merely illustrates that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a
dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative
philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause. Suffice to say that the
showing offered by the appellees does not satisfy us that sex represents a
legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving. In fact,
when it is further recognized that Oklahoma's statute prohibits only the selling
of 3.2% beer to young males and not their drinking the beverage once acquired
(even after purchase by their 18-20-year-old female companions), the
relationship between gender and traffic safety becomes far too tenuous to satisfy
Reed's requirement that the gender-based difference be substantially related to
achievement of the statutory objective. 143

For the civil right to be free from violence motivated by gender, one
could assume that protecting women against violent attack would be an
important objective concerning public health and safety. 144 However,

face, and therefore there is a strong argument that the analysis here should fall under
rational relation scrutiny.
139. Craig, 429 U.S. at 192.
140. Id. at 199-200.
141. Id. at 201.
142. Id. at 201-02.
143. Id. at 204.
144. This assumption does not necessarily mean that the governmental objective
here is indeed an "important" one. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982):
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining
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it becomes much more difficult to determine the "fit" of a legislative
enactment when a particular law is not identified as gender discriminatory, but rather, when entire state criminal justice systems are identified as
violating the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
How should courts view statistics that indict entire state criminal justice
systems, and how tight should the "fit" be?
C.

Statistics, State Criminal Justice Systems, Discriminatory
Purpose, and the Equal Protection Clause

The best guidance to determine that "fit" can be found in McCleskey
v. Kemp, where a defendant convicted of murder alleged that the state's

capital sentencing system violated the Equal Protection Clause. 145 The
defendant offered statistical evidence that purported to show a "disparity
in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of
the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant." 146
From this evidence, one could infer that the state acted with discriminatory purpose. The Court, however, rejected this assertion by reasoning
that
"[d]iscriminatory purpose" ... implies more than intent as volition or intent
as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a
state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group. For this claim to prevail, McCleskey would have to prove
that the Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute
because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect. 147

Because McCleskey could not prove this, the Court refused to infer a
discriminatory purpose by the state because "legislatures necessarily have
wide discretion in the choice of criminal laws and penalties, and . . .
there were legitimate reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt and
maintain capital punishment." 148
Four justices dissented from this decision. In Justice Blackmun's
dissent, he stated a three-prong test for creating an inference of
purposeful discrimination:

whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.
Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one
gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to
be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.
145. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
146. Id. at 286.
147. Id. at 298 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 298-99.

1074

[VOL. 34: 1047, 1997]

Violence Against Women
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

First, [a defendant] must establish that he is a member of a group "that is a
recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment." Second, he must
make a showing of a substantial degree of differential treatment. Third, he must
establish that the alle9edly discriminatory procedure is susceptible to abuse or
is not racially neutral. 49

Finding all three factors in the affirmative, Blackmun acknowledged an
inference of discriminatory purpose, which shifted the burden to the state
to show "that legitimate racially neutral criteria and procedures yielded
this racially skewed result." 150 In sum, only one vote separated the
degree of scrutiny applied to statistical evidence which alleges Equal
Protection violations by state criminal justice systems.
For purposes of the civil rights for women statute, it appears that
Congress would have to prove that the state legislatures enacted or
maintained their criminal laws dealing with violence against women
because of an anticipated gender discriminatory effect. This becomes a
tough burden for Congress to prove if the Court refuses to otherwise
infer discriminatory purpose by the state. Statistics showing vast
disparities between rape prosecutions and murder and robbery prosecutions, or lesser sentences for the perpetrators, do not therefore constitute
an adequate justification for overriding state laws. Thus, if the state
legislatures have legitimate reasons to adopt and maintain their laws
dealing with violence against women, the federal civil remedy for
victims of gender motivated violence fails to pass muster. However, a
shift in the Court could change this result.
Nevertheless, an additional consideration when determining the "fit"
is to examine Congress' findings for a "substantial relation" to "important governmental objectives." The federal civil remedy has been
referred to as a way to ameliorate "hate crimes" against women.
However, none of the statistics involved explicitly examined crimes
motivated by gender hatred. Rather, the reports focused primarily on
rape and domestic abuse. As such, Congress put the cart before the
horse in assuming that these terrible forms of violence are gender
motivated without any proof whatsoever that gender animus was
involved in the criminal activities studied. As a result, courts may not
find that there is a "substantial relation" or a substantial fit between

149.
150.

Id. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 359.
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protecting women's health and safety and the civil right to be free from
violence motivated by gender animus.

D.

Using Section 5 to Reach Private Action

Yet another problem is that the civil rights for women statute reaches
purely private action, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only
state action. This has become clear in the way the Supreme Court has
interpreted the civil causes of action to remedy violent racial discrimination such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Section 1983 allows anyone
who has been deprived of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws" to sue any person who caused that
deprivation while acting ''under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." 151 This
legislation was created bec;:ause of the inability of the state governments
to control the "wave of murders and assaults . . . launched against both
blacks and Union sympathizers." 152 However, it does not reach
"purely private conduct." 153
Section 1985 similarly grants an action for conspiracy to deprive any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, the equal
privileges and immunities of the laws, or any right or privilege of a
United States citizen. 154 This statute does cover private conspiracies,
but the Supreme Court has limited its applicability. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that "Congress was wholly within its powers
under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory
cause of action for Negro citizens who have been the victims of
conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving
them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men." 155 It has
also been "firmly established that the right of interstate travel is
constitutionally protected . . . and is assertable against private as well as
governmental interference." 156 On the other hand, if a plaintiff asserts
a violation of First or Fourteenth Amendment rights, he must prove "that
the [s]tate is involved in the conspiracy, or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the [s]tate." 157

151. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1994).
152. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1973).
153. Id. at 424.
154. 42 u.s.c. § 1985(3) (1994).
155. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971).
156. Id.
157. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S.
825, 830-3 I (1983).
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Applying these principles to the civil rights for women statute, it
becomes clear that Congress has enacted legislation that reaches purely
private conduct because a victim can now sue her attacker for depriving
her of the right to be free from violence motivated by gender. This right
is based on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, yet there has been
no conspiracy between the attacker and the state, nor are gendermotivated attackers involved in conspiracies to influence the state's
activity. To allow this cause of action to remain constitutional,
therefore, would circumvent the Supreme Court's holdings by characterizing this legislation as a method of remedying constitutional violations
by state criminal justice systems instead of as a remedy which addresses
purely private conduct.

V.

UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ

In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 158 which
prohibited possession of firearms within 1000 feet of school grounds.
Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth grade student, was convicted of violating
this law. On April 15, 1995, the Supreme Court handed down a rather
controversial holding----that this law was unconstitutional because it
exceeded the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce
Clause. 159
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified "three
broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power." 160 First, "Congress may regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce." 161 Second, "Congress is empowered
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities." 162 Third, "Congress' commerce
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce." 163

158. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (1994).
159. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
160. Id. at 558.
161. Id. "' [T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce
free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer
open to question."' Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,491 (1917)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 558-59.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly disposed of the first two categories as
irrelevant to the situation, and focused on whether gun possession in a
school zone "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Concluding that
it does not, the opinion states, "Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." 164 Therefore, the statute could not be "sustained under our cases upholding
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a
commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce." 165
The next problem was that there was no jurisdictional element in the
statute to provide for a nexus to interstate commerce, 166 nor were there
any "express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate
commerce of gun possession in a school zone. " 167 As such, three
arguments were presented by the government to show that firearm
possession in a school zone substantially affects interstate commerce.
First, the government stressed that gun possession leads to violent crime,
the "costs [of which] are substantial, and through the mechanism of
insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population." 168
Additionally, the government argued that "violent crime reduces the
willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are
perceived to be unsafe. " 169 Finally, the government stressed that
having guns in schools "poses a substantial threat to the educational
process by threatening the learning environment ... [a] handicapped
educational process, in tum, [results] in a less productive citizenry ...
[t]hat, in tum, would have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic
well-being." 170

164. Id. at 561. "Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated." Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. "[Section] 922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which might limit
its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 562.
167. Id.
We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to
make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce . . . But to the extent that congressional findings would
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial
effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.
Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 563-64.
169. Id. at 564.
170. Id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed the first argument by noting that
under the "costs of crime" reasoning, "Congress could regulate not only
all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce." 171
Under the third argument ("national productivity"), "Congress could
regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child
custody), for example." 172 And although the second argument is not
specifically addressed, Rehnquist states: "Under the theories that the
Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive
any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign_,,, 13
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, however, counseled "great
restraint before the Court determines that the [Commerce] Clause is
insufficient to support an exercise of the national power." 174 Nevertheless, this case required appreciation of ''the significance of federalism in
the whole structure of the Constitution." 175 Kennedy agreed that the
statute was unconstitutional because "neither the actors nor their conduct
have a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of
the statute have an evident commercial nexus." 176 Since "education is
a traditional concern of the states", the statute intruded upon an area of
traditional state concern. 177 Kennedy thought that the reserved powers
of the States were sufficient to enact harsh criminal sanctions if the state
found it necessary to deter students from carrying guns to schools. 178
In his opinion, the statute "foreclose[d] the States from experimenting
and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim
by right and history and expertise." 179
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, felt that the "substantial
effect" test, "if taken to its logical extreme, would give Congress a

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 575.
at 580.
at 581.
at 583.
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'police power' over all aspects of American life." 180 As a result,
Thomas advocated reconsideration of that test, "with an eye toward
constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence." 181 In his view, the Lopez opinion "should not be
viewed as 'radical' or another 'wrong turn' that must be corrected in the
future." 182 Rather, Thomas suggests:
If we wish to be true to a Constitution that does not cede a police power to
the Federal Government, our Commerce Clause's boundaries simply cannot be
"defined" as being "'commensurate with the national needs"' or self-consciously
intended to let the Federal Government '"defend itself against economic forces
that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of the national economy"' ....
Such a formulation of federal power is no test at all: It is a blank check. 183

In the principal dissent, Justice Breyer runs through three basic
principles of Commerce Clause interpretation184 to arrive at this
question: "[W]e must ask whether Congress could have had a rational
basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gunrelated school violence and interstate commerce." 185 Based on available information, it is "clear that the problem of guns in and around
schools is widespread and extremely serious." 186 Furthermore, because
"[e]ducation ... has long been inextricably intertwined with the Nation's
economy," 187 is it not obvious that "a widespread, serious, and substantial physical threat to teaching and learning also substantially threatens
the commerce to which that teaching and learning is inextricably

Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 585.
Id. at 60 I.
Id. at 602 (citations omitted).
Id. at 615-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
First, the power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,"
encompassses the power to regulate local activities insofar as they significantly
affect interstate commerce. . . .
Second, in determining whether a local activity will likely have a significant
effect upon interstate commerce, a court must consider, not the effect of an
individual act (a single instance of gun possession), but rather the cumulative
effect of all similar instances (i.e., the effect of all guns possessed in or near
schools) ....
Third . . . Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the
existence of a significant factual connection between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce---both because the Constitution delegates the commerce
power directly to Congress and because the determination requires an
empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to
make with accuracy.
185. Id. at 618.
186. Id. at 619.
187. Id. at 620.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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tied?" 188 As a consequence, Breyer concluded that Congress could
have had a rational basis for finding the requisite nexus between gun
possession and interstate commerce.
More importantly, Justice Breyer pointed out three serious legal
problems with the majority's holding. First, the majority's holding "runs
contrary to modem Supreme Court cases that have upheld congressional
actions despite connections to interstate or foreign commerce that are
less significant than the effect of school violence." 189 In Perez v.
United States, for example, the Court upheld a federal statute against
loan sharking at a local level because Congress had found that "loan
sharking in its national setting is one way organized crime holds its guns
to the heads of the poor and the rich alike and syphons funds from
numerous localities to finance its national operations." 190 As Justice
Breyer reasoned, the "negative impact upon the national economy of an
inability to teach basic skills seems no smaller (nor less significant) than
that of organized crime." 191 Equally, Justice Breyer continues, in the
cases of Katzenbach v. McClung 192 and Daniel v. Paul, 193 "the Court
understood that the specific instance of discrimination (at a local place
of accommodation) was part of a general practice that, considered as a
whole, caused not only the most serious human and social harm, but had
nationally significant economic dimensions as well." 194 Moreover,
Breyer asserts that businesses and families are less likely to move to
areas where guns and violence plague the schools. 195 These local
instances in tum will have "nationally significant economic dimensions."196 Lastly in Wicka.rd v. Filburn, the Court upheld application
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to a farmer who grew and
consumed wheat on his own local farm because in the aggregate, this

188. Id. at 622-23.
189. Id. at 625.
190. 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971).
191. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 626.
192. 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Civil Rights Act against racial discrimination
at local restaurant).
193. 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (finding an effect on commerce caused by an amusement
park located several miles down a country road in the middle of Alabama because some
customers, some food, 15 paddleboats, and a juke box had come from out of state).
194. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 626.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 627.
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affected interstate commerce. 197 Since the Court gave Congress "the
benefit of the doubt" in Wickard, Breyer believed the same leeway
should be given to the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 198
The second legal problem for Justice Breyer relates to the Court's
efforts to "reconcile its holding with earlier cases by making a critical
distinction between 'commercial' and noncommercial 'transaction[s]' ." 199 Breyer cautions that this distinction cannot be reconciled
"with either the civil rights cases (McClung and Daniel) or Perez. In
each of those cases the specific transaction (the race-based exclusion, the
use of force) was not itself 'commercial'." 200 Furthermore, the line
between educational and commercial activities is "almost impossible do
draw . . . [because] [s]chools . . . serve both social and commercial
purposes. "201 Thus for Commerce Clause purposes, Congress could
"consider schools as roughly analogous to commercial investments from
which the Nation derives the benefit of an educated work force." 202
Third, the Court's holding "threatens legal uncertainty in an area of
law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled."203 Will any
of the statutes enacted that use the words "affecting commerce" or that
have no jurisdictional element at all be considered to "regulate noncommercial activities?"204 Whatever the result, Breyer predicts that "the
legal uncertainty now created will restrict Congress' ability to enact
criminal laws aimed at criminal behavior that, considered problem by
problem rather than instance by instance, seriously threatens the
economic, as well as social, well-being of Americans."205
VI.

SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION OF LOPEZ TO OTHER
STATUTES BY LOWER COURTS

Justice Breyer's warning about the legal uncertainty that will ensue
from the Lopez decision has borne fruit in the myriad of cases that have
arisen challenging the constitutionality of many Commerce Clause based
laws. These laws range from gun possession to carjacking, and from the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act to the Child Support
Recovery Act.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
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317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Lopez, 514 U.S at 627.
Id.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 630-31.
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A.

Gun Possession-18 US.C. § 922(g)(J)

The gun possession cases are brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(l) which criminalizes possession of "any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce" by a felon. 206 Three cases involving challenges to this
statute have upheld the constitutionality of§ 922(g)(l) because, unlike
the statute in Lopez, § 922(g)(l) contains an express jurisdictional
element requiring that the felon's possession of the firearm or ammunition be "in or affecting commerce".207 As one court reasoned, "[i]n
light of the Lopez Court's citation to [United States v.] Bass, it appears
that the Lopez decision was not intended to overrule the Bass and
Scarborough [v. United States] line of cases."208 Thus, "proof that the
possessed firearm previously traveled at some time in interstate
commerce [is] sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between
possession and commerce."209 However, this statute may still be
unconstitutional; almost all consumer goods are shipped "in interstate or
foreign commerce," thus under this reasoning, Congress could prohibit
the possession of almost anything. Further, there seems to be little
reason why the federal government must have jurisdiction over felons
possessing firearms to the exclusion of state courts.

206. 18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(l) (1994):
It shall be unlawful for any person--(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
Id.

207. United States v. Brown, 893 F. Supp. 11, 12 (M.D.N.C. 1995); see also United
States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456
(9th Cir. 1995).
208. Brown, 893 F. Supp. at 12. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)
(interpreting the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l) as requiring an additional nexus
to interstate commerce); see also Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575
( 1977) (concluding that the predecessor of § 922(g)( 1) required only "the minimal nexus
that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.").
209. Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 564.
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B.

Carjacking-18 U.S.C. § 2119

In response to the carjacking problem, Congress passed a statute which
criminalized carjacking of motor vehicles that have been ''transported,
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce."210 The three
cases that have reached the Courts of Appeals concerning this statute
have all been resolved in favor of the statute's constitutionality because
the statute has the jurisdictional requirement that the cars must move in
interstate commerce as well as because the statute was deemed to
regulate an economic activity. 211 Again, Congress only needed a
rational basis for believing that the crime substantially affects interstate
commerce. 212 However, this statute may suffer from the same infirmities as the gun possession statute. Almost all products "move in

18 u.s.c. § 2119 (1994):
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, takes a
motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or
foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall( 1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results,
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number
of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.

210.

Id.

211. First, carjacking is economic in a way that possession of a handgun in a
school zone is not. When a criminal points a gun at a victim and takes his or
her car, the criminal has made an economic gain and the victim has suffered
an undeniable and substantial loss. Replicated 15,000 or 20,000 times per
year, the economic effects are indeed profound. By comparison, no matter
how many criminals possess guns in school zones, there is no direct economic
effect that arises from the crimes.
Furthermore, Congress enacted the carjacking provision as one aspect of a
national solution to a national economic problem. Every automobile theft is,
by definition, local in its particulars, yet Congress could have rationally
believed that it had to regulate carjacking-whether or not it was strictly
"commercial" or "economic"-as one aspect of its comprehensive response to
the national and international business of criminal auto theft.
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 581 (3rd Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted).
See also United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted):
The carjacking statute has a very different background. First, it applies only
to the forcible taking of a car "that has been transported, shipped, or received
in interstate or foreign commerce" Second, cars are themselves instrumentalities of commerce, which Congress may protect. Lastly, we note that Congress
was not silent regarding the effect of carjacking on interstate commerce ...
That Congress was addressing economic evils of an interstate nature
differentiates the carjacking statute from the firearms statute invalidated in
Lopez.

See also United States v. Carolina 61 F.3d 917 (unpublished opinion) (10th Cir. 1995).
212. See Bishop, 66 F.3d at 576.
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interstate commerce," and carjacking is more of a local crime.
Professional auto thieves, who in their "national criminal enterprise" ship
stolen cars across state lines, probably will not resort to the most violent
and conspicuous form of auto theft if they wish to remain "in business."
C.

Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act-18 US.C. § 248

In response to increasing incidents of violence at abortion clinics,
Congress enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act in
order to "protect and promote the public safety and health and activities
affecting interstate commerce by establishing Federal criminal penalties
and civil remedies for certain violent, threatening, obstructive and
destructive conduct that is intended to injure, intimidate or interfere with
persons seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services."213
The Act imposes civil and criminal penalties against anyone who:
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or
interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from,
obtaining or providing reproductive health services;
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts
to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health services .... 21

When Lopez was used to challenge the Act's constitutionality, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted: "Congress' findings are
plausible and provide a rational basis for concluding that the Access Act
regulates activity which 'substantially affects' interstate commerce. Thus,
the Access Act is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause."215 However, a strong argument remains that this

213. 18 u.s.c. § 248 (1994).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a).
215. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995). Before reaching this
conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Lopez as follows:
Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Access Act does regulate
commercial activity, the provision ofreproductive health services. Moreover,
as the Fourth Circuit noted, extensive legislative findings support Congress'
conclusion that the Access Act regulates activity which substantially affects
interstate commerce. Congress found that doctors and patients often travel
across state lines to provide and receive services, in other words, there is an
interstate market both with respect to patients and doctors. In addition, the
clinics receive supplies through interstate commerce. Congress further found
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statute is unconstitutional as well because it has no jurisdictional
requirement of crossing state lines. Further, if this statute is a valid
exercise of power, Congress should be able to make federal laws against
interfering with, obtaining, or providing any kind of services, although
Congress already has passed laws against the arson or bombing of
commercial property.

D.

Child Support Recovery Act of 1992-18 US.C. § 228

Although Lopez caused uncertainty in the examples above, the courts
have nevertheless resolved the issues on the side of constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause. However, one statute has created some
controversy in the district courts: the Child Support Recovery Act of
1992 ("CSRA"). The CSRA punishes the willful failure to pay past due
child support to a child who resides in another state.216 While three
that violence, and physical obstruction of clinic entrances, threatened interstate
commerce in the provision of reproductive health services. Id. Thus, in
protecting the commercial activities of reproductive health providers, the
Access Act protects and regulates commercial enterprises operating in
interstate commerce.
Id. at 1520 (citations omitted).
For treatment of another federal statute dealing with extortion and abortion clinics, see
United States v. Arena, 894 F. Supp. 580, 584-85 (N.D.N.Y. 1995):
The Hobbs Act is distinguishable from the Gun-Free School Zone Act in
that the former expressly requires a connection to commerce. The Hobbs Act
applies only to one who "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce" through extortion. Further, in the instant case, the government
pleads an affect on interstate commerce. The damages to Dr. Yoffa's office
affects interstate commerce because he treats out-of-state patients. Additionally, both Planned Parenthood and Dr. Yoffa purchase goods in interstate
commerce. Under a "depletion of assets theory," commerce is effected [sic]
when an enterprise, which either is actively engaged in interstate commerce or
regularly purchases items in interstate commerce, has its assets depleted
through extortion, thereby curtailing its potential as a purchaser of such goods.
In short, the Hobbs Act is unaffected by the ruling in Lopez, and defendant
Wentworth's arguments that the Hobbs Act is unconstitutional or inapplicable
to the circumstances of this case are unpersuasive.
Id. (citations omitted).
216. 18 u.s.c. § 228 (1994):
(a) Offense.-Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation
with respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).
(b) Punishment-The punishment for an offense under this section is(I) in the case of a first offense under this section, a fine under this
title, imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both; and
(2) in any other case, a fine under this title, imprisonment for not
more than 2 years, or both.
(c) Restitution.-Upon a conviction under this section, the court shall
order restitution under section 3663 in an amount equal to the past due
support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.
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courts have found the CSRA to be unconstitutional, 217 four others have
considered it constitutional. 218
On the side of constitutionality, the court in United States v. Sage
found that the non-payment of child support substantially affects
interstate commerce because "Congress considered that of the $48 billion
in child support payments owed nationally according to court judgments,
a total of $35 billion has never been collected. . .. Of that amount,
interstate cases are responsible for an estimated minimum of $14 billion
in uncollected support."219 Therefore, "the very act of withholding
payment causes a depletion of assets that affects interstate commerce. "220 The non-payment "will reduce the child's consumption of
goods in interstate commerce" as well as that of the custodial parent. 221
In addition, non-payment of all interstate support cases in the aggregate,
"would inevitably force substantial shifts in the interstate flow of goods,
because the total amount of interstate support owed is estimated to be
billions of dollars. " 222
The Sage court also found persuasive the argument that non-payment
of child support "has a substantial effect on interstate commerce in part
because states have been unable to enforce their own support orders
through interstate enforcement efforts."223 State measures such as the

(d) Definitions.-As used in this section(1) the term "past due support obligation" means any amount (A) determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State to be due from a
person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child
and the parent with whom the child is living; and
(B) that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year,
or is greater than $5,000....
217. United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d
787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev 'd,
United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Parker, 911 F.
Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bailey,
902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
218. United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 753 (1997); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995),
vacated, 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F.Supp. 389
(S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn.. 1995), cen. denied,
117 S. Ct. 784 (1997).
219. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 90.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 91.
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Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act were ineffective
because of "state boundaries and 'laws and processes that differ from
state to state. "'224 As such, "Congress need not wait until a national
problem reaches crisis proportions in order to act. " 225
The court in United States v. Hopper adopted a different justification:
"that the act of collecting an obligation, though dealing with an
intangible, does amount to commerce."226 Deriving its authority from
United States v. Shubert,227 the court reasoned that commerce exists
when there is a "continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among
the states involving the transmission of large sums of money and
communications by mail, telephone, and telegraph."228 As such,
interstate child support payments are commerce, because "[p]ayment of
support results in large sums of money being transmitted, and the
amount of child support not paid is significant. Clearly, attempts to
collect that past due support involve the mail, telephone and telegraph ...229
Yet another court upheld the Act by acknowledging "Congress' power
under the commerce clause to criminalize activity involving interstate
travel."23° Citing federal criminal statutes such as fleeing a state to
avoid prosecution or to avoid testifying,231 and willfully transporting
an abductee across state lines,232 the court upheld the CSRA because
"Lopez . . . itself affirmed that Congress has the authority 'to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral or injurious
uses. "'233 As such, "Lopez does not prohibit Congress from enacting
laws aimed at regulating the use of interstate travel as a means by which
to avoid the legal obligations arising from family responsibilities."234
All of the above courts found that even though there were no words
such as "in commerce" or "affecting commerce" in the CSRA, the
statute did not lack a "jurisdictional element" because "the CSRA does
explicitly require as an element of the crime that there be a willful

224. Id. (quoting 138 CONG. REC. H7326 (1992)).
225. Id.
226. United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
227. 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (discussing how the tenns "Trade or Commerce" are
applied under the Shennan Act).
228. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 392 (quoting United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222,
226 (1955)).
229. Id. at 393.
230. United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D. Va. 1995).
231. 18 u.s.c. § 1073 (1994).
232. 18 u.s.c. § 1201 (1994).
233. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995)).
234. Id. at 617.
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failure to provide support to a child 'who resides in another state. "'235
As such, "[b]y limiting regulation to interstate payments only, a nexus
to interstate commerce is assured. " 236 Therefore, these courts found
that the CSRA did not suffer from the same infirmity as the statute in·
Lopez.
The other three courts differed markedly in their view of the effect of
Lopez on the CSRA. 237 In United States v. Mussari, as in Lopez, the
court dismissed the first two categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under the Commerce Clause as inapplicable.238 The Mussari
court then found that the CSRA did not have a "substantial relation to
interstate commerce" because the CSRA is a "criminal statute aimed at
punishing parents delinquent in their child support payments"239 and
because the CSRA is "aimed at an area of activity which has already
been addressed by the States. "240 The interstate nexus was insufficient
because the statute only requires that the delinquent parent live in
another state, and allowing this to be an adequate nexus "would in
essence give Congress carte blanche to regulate any area it deemed
appropriate, even if such area was traditionally one regulated by the
States, i.e. marriage, divorce, child custody, etc."241 Next, the Mussari
court rejected the argument that Congress could enact "criminal
legislation to redress activities which arguably affect federal monies"

235. United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D. Ind. 1995); see also
United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 89-90 (D. Conn. 1995) and Murphy, 893 F.
Supp. at 616.
236. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 89-90.
237. These three courts, in four cases, all found the Child Support Recovery Act
unconstitutional: United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev 'd, 1997
WL 99715 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995);
United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, United
v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
238. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1363. "Clearly criminalizing the failure to pay child
support would not qualify as the regulation of the use of the channels of interstate
commerce, nor would it qualify as the regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce." Id.
239. Id. "[T]he CSRA is a 'criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms."' Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,561 (1995)).
240. Id. at 1364.
241. Id. As such, "the statute is clearly not tailored to address only those parents
who specifically flee from a state in order to avoid paying child support." Id.
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such as the failure to pay child support.242 Finally, the court found
that the CSRA violated the "principles of federalism and comity . . .
[because] the areas of criminal law and child custody are traditionally
delegated to the States for regulation."243
In United States v. Parker, the court opined that Congress did not
have a rational basis to conclude that the willful failure to pay child
support is the kind of regulated activity which substantially affects
interstate commerce.244 Borrowing from Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
court found that the CSRA "has nothing to do with commerce or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms"245 because:
An obligation to pay child support is a debt arising from a state court divorce
decree that is intended to benefit a custodial parent and children in the
aftermath of a family breakup. The obligation is created when some or all of
the members of a family as defined by state law stand before a state court
having jurisdiction over such matters in a single state. In many child support
cases, including this case, the noncustodial parent is required under state law
to make the payment to the state, and the money is then forwarded by the state
to the beneficiaries. The failure to make these payments affects primarily the
parents and the children born of or dependent upon the marriage. Arm's-length

242.
243.

Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1367.
Further, actual application of the CSRA would force federal courts to review
and apply orders of state courts in violation of principles of federalism and
comity. A defendant being prosecuted under the CSRA could arguably defend
the action by challenging the validity of the underlying state court support
order. Either the federal court would be forced to review the support order,
or stay the pending federal criminal case while the support order is collaterally
attacked in state court. Neither of these scenarios is desirable in light of the
principles of comity and the speedy trial provisions federal courts are bound
by in criminal matters.

Id.

244. 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd, 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997). The
Parker court dismissed the Government's arguments that the CSRA is constitutional as
a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce based on the following
analysis:
[The CSRA] does not regulate the movement of goods or persons in
interstate commerce. It regulates the willful failure to pay a past due child
support obligation. The unpaid money in child support arrearage cases is not
a "good." Even if it were, when a person is charged with the willful failure
to pay child support, he or she is being charged with not transferring money
across state lines. Indeed, in the circumstance where the dependent child
moves out of state, the parent who is required to make the payment to the state
does not get involved in an interstate transaction at all. Further, because
[CSRA] does not regulate the shipping of goods or the movement of persons
in interstate commerce, Darby and Heart of Atlanta Motel are inapplicable. For
these reasons, [CSRA] does not involve the regulation of a use or channel of
interstate commerce.
Id. at 842-43.
245. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
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commercial actors are not involved in any way. The marketplace for goods and
services and prices of commodities are not affected at all. There are no affiliates
or cohorts that comprise part of a greater economic network or enterprise. A
citizen's ability to travel is not threatened. A willful failure to pay a courtordered sum, without more, involves no other crimes. The activity at issue,
therefore, has simply nothing to do with commerce in the context of the limited
power given to the federal government and withheld from the states in the
Commerce Clause. 246

The court was not persuaded by the "few minimal links with interstate
activity" such as "financial transfers across state lines, most likely
through the mail" or extradition of the debtor or investigation of the
debtor's whereabouts involving "out-of-state travel or cross-state
telephone contacts" to justify the CSRA "as the sort of economic
enterprise that substantially affects interstate commerce."247 Even
though there was a "$5.1 billion annual deficit in child support payments
in 1989 ... the mere fact that an activity involves billions of dollars,
without more, is insufficient to show a substantial relationship between
the activity and interstate commerce. . . . The focus must be on the
activity, not the dollar figure." 248
The court rejected the government's two arguments for the substantial
effects of not paying child support. Under the "basic necessities" theory,
the government argued that ''the nonpayment of child support causes
many custodial parents and their children to be unable to afford
sufficient housing, food, medical care and other goods and services. "249
The court responded that this theory would give Congress the power "to
enact a criminal offense prohibiting any crime that deprives another
person of money."250 Under the "federal subsidy theory," the govern-

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 834-35 (citations omitted).
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id. at 838.
Id.

Congress, under this scenario, could punish embezzlers, con artists, and
muggers--even if their activity was solely intrastate-because the proceeds of
the crimes likely would have helped the victim afford food, housing, medical
care, or other goods and services. If the court were to follow this reasoning,
it would be converting traditionally state-enforced, common-law crimes of theft
into federal crimes, thus derogating the constitutionally critical "distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local." The "basic necessities" theory, therefore, is almost identical to the "national productivity" theory
that the Lopez Court rejected and, thus, does not prove that nonpayment of
child support has a significant effect on interstate commerce.

1091

ment asserted that the "nonpayment of support orders causes many
women and children to become dependent upon welfare and other
programs that are funded by federal money, and this substantially affects
interstate commerce."251 The court responded that "[s]imply showing
that an activity somehow might diminish a family's budget, thus causing
it to request federal welfare assistance, is too attenuated a link to
interstate commerce upon which to ground Congress's Commerce Clause
power."252
The Parker court continued by characterizing Wickard v. Filbum 253
"as the outer boundary of Congress's Commerce Clause power."254
Unlike the situation in Wickard, where home grown wheat competed
with wheat for sale in the marketplace, "the failure to pay child support
has no effect on prices of goods and services in interstate commerce. "255 The Parker court distinguished United States v. Perez,256
which upheld a statute prohibiting extortionate credit transactions, as
follows:
First, a person who intentionally fails to pay child support usually does so
apart from any national enterprise or syndicate. Second, the nonpayment of
support obligations does not affect the independence of any businesses. Third,
unlike the facts of Perez, there is no "tie-in" between willful failures to pay a
child support obligation and interstate crime. 257

Lastly, the court distinguished the post-Lopez carjacking case, United
States v. Bishop, as follows: 258
First, the noncustodial spouse who owes the money but willfully does not
pay does not do so to generate a "profit" in the usual sense of the word. He
or she may be keeping money that rightfully belongs to the children and comes
out ahead in that regard, but there is no plan to secure a return on an
investment, as the term "profit" connotes. Second, willfully avoiding a past due
child support obligation typically is not accompanied by the commission of
other crimes. Third, the intentional nonpayment of child support is not a
component of a greater enterprise, network or business engaged in depriving
custodial parents and children of payments to which they are legally entitled.259

Id. (citations omitted).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 837.
253. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
254. Id. (interpreting the Supreme Court's statement in Lopez, that Wickard is
"perhaps the most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity." 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).
255. Id. at 840.
256. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
257. Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 840.
258. 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995).
259. Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 841.
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Instead, the court found that the challenge to the CSRA resembled that
in Lopez because "[n]either the possession of a handgun nor the willful
failure to pay child support involve 'enterprises' that deal in interstate
commerce."260 These courts, which held the CSRA unconstitutional,
appear more consistent with the Lopez decision.
VII.

APPLICATION OF LOPEZ TO 18 U.S.C.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

§ 2261-INTERSTATE

Based on Lopez and its subsequent treatment in the lower courts, does
the new interstate domestic violence crime remain constitutional? First
one must ask whether crossing a state line, or causing a spouse to cross
a state line, and committing a crime of violence which injures a spouse
or intimate partner is a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Under firmly established principles, one could say that
"[c]ommerce among the states ... consists of intercourse and traffic
between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and
property. There may be, therefore, a movement of persons as well as of
property; that is, a person may move or be moved in interstate commerce. "261 As such, "Congress has power over transportation 'among
the several states' . . . the power is complete in itself, and . . . Congress,
as an incident to it, may adopt not only means necessary but convenient
to its exercise, and the means may have the quality of police regulations."262 This analysis supports the constitutionality of the interstate

Id.
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913).
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, state and nation having
different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said; but it must be kept in mind
that we are one people; and the powers reserved to the states and those
conferred on the nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or
concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and moral. This is the
effect of the decisions; and surely, if the facility of interstate transportation can
be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene
literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food and
drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the systematic enticement to
and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women, and, more
insistently, of girls.
Id. at 322.
262. Id. at 323.
260.
261.
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domestic violence crime considering its regulation of persons moving or
being moved in interstate commerce.
This conclusion appears to be consistent with the Lopez Court's
apparent approval of the statement that "the authority of Congress to
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and
injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to
question."263 Further, 18 U.S.C. § 2261, unlike the statute in Lopez,
does contain an express jurisdictional element which will limit its reach
to violent crimes that "additionally have an explicit connection with or
effect on interstate commerce."264 As such, crossing a state line to
commit domestic violence is comparable to the post-Lopez gun
possession cases265 where the constitutionality of the statute was
upheld because of the requirement that the gun be possessed "in or
affecting commerce," and "proof that the possessed firearm previously
traveled at some time in interstate commerce [is] sufficient to satisfy the
statutorily required nexus between possession and commerce."266 18
U.S.C. § 2261 is also comparable to the post-Lopez carjacking cases,
which found a sufficient nexus due to the requirement that the vehicles
be transported, shipped, or received in interstate commerce.267 The
difference that 18 U.S.C. Section 2261 regulates persons' actions while
traveling interstate, whereas these other two areas regulate things that
have traveled at some point in interstate commerce, makes the argument
even stronger that the interstate domestic violence statute is constitutional.
However, if courts read Lopez as requiring some sort of "commercial
transaction" or "economic activity," § 2261 may indeed be unconstitutional. If courts reason that cases upholding regulations dealt with
commercial transactions such as transporting women across state lines
for immoral purposes (prostitution) or such as kidnapping (ransom), then
courts may find that § 2261 does not propose a commercial transaction
such as these, and therefore, the idea that "[n]or does it make any
difference whether the transportation is commercial in character"268
was implicitly overruled in Lopez. This reasoning would be faulty,
though, because the Supreme Court has already recognized that "women

263. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,558 (1995) (quoting Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)).
264. Id. at 562.
265. See supra pp. 39-40.
266. United States v. Brown, 893 F. Supp. 11, 12 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
267. See supra pp. 40-41.
268. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (citing
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 484-86 (1917)).
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are not articles of merchandise,"269 and it has upheld amendments to
the Federal Kidnapping Act which extended "Federal jurisdiction under
the act to persons who have been kidnapped and held, not only for
reward, but for any other reason. ,mo
The next question is whether § 2261 is a regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.271 The case law which supports this
category of activity focuses on vehicles used in commerce such as
trains272 and planes. 273 Here, the carjacking cases lend some support
because to cross a state line, a spouse abuser will probably use some
form of motorized transportation. The carjacking statute criminalizes a
forceful taking of a car that has been "transported, shipped, or received"
in commerce, while possessing a firearm. 274 There, an activity was
criminalized, and Congress was justified to enact this measure because
of a car moving "in commerce" at some point in time. Here, Congress
has criminalized domestic abuse, and could probably do so based on the
fact that the abuser will accomplish this by using a vehicle that has
moved in commerce. However, the concern remains that Congress, in
passing the carjacking statute, was responding to the "national and
international business of auto theft" which implicates commerce. 275
Finally, if a court were to conclude that § 2261 is not a regulation of
the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, does the
regulated activity of interstate domestic violence substantially affect
interstate commerce? As stated previously,276 "estimates suggest that
we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health care, criminal justice, and
other social costs of domestic violence."277 Thus, it could be argued,

269. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913).
270. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936).
271. The second test, as written in Lopez, states that "Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities."
Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). For purposes here, the author has
analyzed "persons or things in interstate commerce" under the channels of interstate
commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 255-64.
272. See Southern R.R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (191 I) (upholding
application of Safety Appliance Act to railroad cars).
273. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) ("[A]s for example, the
destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32).").
274. 18 u.s.c. § 2119 (1994).
275. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
277. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993).
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like in Lopez, that the costs of domestic violence "are substantial, and,
through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout
the population."278 Unfortunately, this argument was rejected by the
Lopez majority: "The Government admits, under its 'costs of crime'
reasoning, that Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but
all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how
tenuously they relate to interstate commerce."279 As a result, this
statute might be viewed as "a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms."280
The post-Lopez cases in the lower courts that have upheld carjacking
and gun possession statutes can be distinguished from the interstate
domestic violence statute because the cars and guns have been bought
and sold at some point in time; therefore these activities affect economic
activity whereas domestic abuse does not. Expanding further on this
economic activity distinction, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act regulates a "commercial activity, the provision of reproductive
health services."281 Several factors show the substantial effect on
interstate commerce: an interstate market of doctors and patients
traveling across state lines to give and receive services; clinics' receiving
supplies through interstate commerce; and violence and physical
obstruction of clinic entrances threatening the administration of health
services.282 Again, there exists an economic activity with a health
clinic that is not present with interstate domestic violence.
The only post-Lopez cases that place less emphasis on the economic
activity requirement were those that found the Child Support Recovery
Act constitutional. 283 While one court stated that interstate child
support payments are commerce,284 others either acknowledged
"Congress' power under the commerce clause to criminalize activity
involving interstate travel,"285 or found that nonpayment of support
causes a "depletion of assets" that reduces "the child's consumption of
goods in interstate commerce."286 As such, these recent CSRA cases
provide the strongest support for the interstate domestic violence statute

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
F. Supp.
286.
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United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 561.
Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id.
See supra pp. 44-46.
United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614,616 (W.D. Va. 1995), vacated, 934
736 (1996).
United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 90 (1995).
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under the third prong, but travel is closer to the channels of interstate
commerce prong, and the "depletion of assets" theory seems too tenuous
to support the substantial effects test.
In sum, the interstate domestic violence statute does not suffer from
any lack of a "jurisdictional element which would ensure, through caseby-case inquiry, that the [domestic violence] in question affects interstate
commerce."287 Because it applies only to domestic violence which
occurs by crossing a state line, it should pass constitutional muster if the
statute is considered to be a valid regulation of the channels of interstate
commerce, and if there is no rigid requirement that the regulated activity
be commercial in character. Requiring the activity to be commercial in
character would invalidate many federal crimes relating to crossing state
lines, which does not seem to be the intent of the Lopez Court.
VIII.

APPLICATION OF LOPEZ TO 42 U.S.C.
(CIVIL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN)

§ 13981

As stated previously, this statute creates a civil action for victims of
crimes of violence motivated by gender. 288 However, the statute
imposes no requirement of crossing state lines; thus, the statute cannot
be considered a regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. This statute cannot be compared to guns or cars
that are moved in interstate commerce. Rather, this statute speaks to
"activities affecting interstate commerce."289 As such, it invites
comparisons to Lopez, and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act. The Congressional Record noted that:
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate,
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of violence
motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce,
by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and
decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products. 290

287. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
288. See supra Part II.
289. 42 U.S.C. § l3981(a) (1994).
290. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (1994) (joint explanatory statement of the
Committee of Conference).
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This justification bears strong resemblance to the argument advanced in
Lopez, that "the presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to
the educational process by threatening the learning environment. " 291
Here, violence motivated by gender poses a threat to potential victims
by deterring interstate travel, employment in interstate business, and
transactions with businesses involved in interstate commerce. In Lopez,
"a handicapped educational process . . . result[s] in a less productive
citizenry.... [which] in turn, [has] an adverse effect on the nation's
well-being."292 Here, the adverse effect on travel, employment, and
business will diminish national productivity, increase medical and other
costs, and decrease the supply and demand for interstate products.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Lopez rejects this
justification, because ''under the Government's 'national productivity'
reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related
to the economic productivity of individual citizens: familr law (including
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example." 93 Under this
theory, not only would it be "difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power,"294 but "[t]o uphold the Government's contentions here,
we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."295
Chief Justice Rehnquist also rejects the argument that violent crime
affects the national economy by imposing substantial costs which are
spread throughout society.296 Under this reasoning, "Congress could
regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to
violent crime, no matter how tenuously they relate to interstate
commerce."297 As applied to 42 U.S.C. § 13981, it would mean that
Congress could regulate all activities which may increase "medical and
other costs, and decreas[e] the supply and demand for interstate
products,"298 no matter how tenuously those activities relate to interstate commerce.
Considering that the bases on which Congress found that gendermotivated violence affects interstate commerce mirror those argued in

291. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 567.
296. Id. at 563-64.
297. Id. at 564.
298. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (1994) (joint explanatory statement of the
Committee of Conference).
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Lopez, it is fair to say that Rehnquist's majority would also find 42
U.S.C. § 13981 unconstitutional. However, first it is necessary to
distinguish the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("The
Act"). 299
On its face, the Act has striking similarities with 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
Both establish civil remedies against violent conduct, and neither have
any express jurisdictional element such as crossing a state line. But to
reiterate, several factors show the substantial effect of clinic violence on
interstate commerce: an interstate market of doctors and patients
traveling across state lines to give and receive services; clinics' receiving
supplies through interstate commerce; and violence and physical
obstruction of clinic entrances threatening the provision of health
services.300 42 U.S.C. § 13981 does not have the benefit of a close link
with commercial service or medical supplies. Rather, the links are
distant: violence motivated by gender will deter ''fo?tential victims from
engaging in employment in interstate business" 01 instead of actually
preventing provision of services; it will decrease "the supply of and the
demand for interstate products"302 instead of actually affecting specific
supplies needed to operate a clinic. As such, 42 U.S.C. § 13981
presents another opportunity for the Court to deny the expansion of
commerce clause jurisprudence.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Justice Breyer was correct in saying that the Lopez Court's holding
"threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed
reasonably well settled."303 However well-settled the law may have
been, Commerce Clause jurisprudence was problematic and confusing
because the original meaning of the Commerce Clause had become
terribly diluted; Congress could pass any law provided it had a rational
basis to find a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. It requires
a great leap of faith to convert the phrase "The Congress shall have
Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the

299. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1994).
300. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995).
301. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (1994) (joint explanatory statement of the
Committee of Conference).
302. Id.
303. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 630 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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several States"304 to Congress shall have the power to create civil
rights actions for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender
because there is a "substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by
deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in
employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business,
and in places involved, in interstate commerce."305 As such, it is
unsurprising that Justice Thomas advocated reconsideration of the
substantial effects test in a future case.306
The point of this conclusion is not to say that Congress should not
have the authority to pass laws such as the gender motivated violence
statute. Rather, if the American people decide that Congress should
have a general police power, let it be through Constitutional amendment,
and not through verbal contortions of the Commerce Clause.
Violence against women is a despicable, disheartening, and unfortunately, fairly common phenomenon. It is only natural for legislators to
want to do something to prevent its occurrence. However, tenuous links
to the Commerce Clause are inadequate to justify creating civil rights
remedies for violence motivated by gender animus. If such laws are
indeed constitutional, then "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power."307
Senator Biden said that "none of the proposals in the (Violence
Against Women Act], alone or together, are likely to end violence
against women. The legislation is, however, a first step in developing
a national consensus that society will not tolerate such violence."308
It seems to the author that a national consensus is hardly furthered by
enacting a civil rights remedy that requires something such as "a
defendant entered a department store carrying a gun, picked out women
in the store and shot her while screamin§i anti-women epithets, and
leaving the many nearby men unharmed."3 It is better served by the
other elements of the Violence Against Women Act which provide
criminal penalties for crossing state lines to commit domestic violence,
funding for counseling and domestic abuse shelters, and education on the
biases women face on domestic matters in the courts.

304. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
305. 140 CONG. REC. H8772-03 (1994) (joint explanatory statement of the
Committee of Conference).
306. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).
307. Id. at 564.
308. s. REP. No. 103-138, at 138 (1993).
309. Id. at 51.
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X.

RECENT CASES INVOLVING 18 U.S.C. § 2261 &
42 u.s.c. § 13981

After this comment was written, three challenges to the constitutionality of the above statutes were decided, one involving the interstate
domestic violence statute, the other two involving the civil right to be
free from violence motivated by gender statute. As mentioned in the
introduction, the Brzonkala case which was instituted in 1995 is one of
these decisions. The constitutionality of the interstate domestic violence
statute was upheld, while the other two district courts were split on the
constitutionality of the civil rights statute. This part will briefly
summarize the main arguments and holdings of those cases.

A.

United States v. Gluzman & 18 US.C. § 2261

In United States v. Gluzman, a woman was charged with conspiring
to commit interstate domestic violence and for committing interstate
domestic violence. 310 Specifically, the indictment charged that Rita
Gluzman "conspired to, and actually did, travel from New Jersey to New
York with the intent to murder her estranged husband, and that, once in
New York, she murdered him, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261."311
Relying on Lopez, Gluzman subsequently brought a motion to dismiss
her indictment "arguing that section 2261 neither regulates a commercial
activity nor contains a requirement that the activity in question be
connected to interstate commerce, and therefore its enactment exceeded
the authority of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause."312
Gluzman argued that the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2261 did not
support Congress' authority to enact the statute under the Commerce
Clause, and "that Congress is limited, under its Commerce powers, to
regulating only those activities that have an economic component or that
implicate some other attribute of commerce."313
The court disagreed with Gluzman, finding that "Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that the regulation of interstate domestic
violence was 'reasonably adapted to [an] end permitted by the Constitu-

310.
311.
312.
313.

United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id.
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tion. "'314 The court did not think that the statute was subject to the
analysis in Lopez under the "substantially affects interstate commerce"
language:
Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, section 2261 does not regulate purely
local activity, but, instead, is an exercise of Congress' power under the first
category of cases articulated by the Lopez Court------the authority to regulate the
use of channels of commerce. Furthermore, the section clearly requires an
identifiable interstate nexus, namely, the crossing of a state line with the
criminal intent to commit domestic violence against one's spouse and the actual
commission of such violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 226l(a). Section 2261 therefore
avoids the constitutional deficiencies identified in Lopez where the interstate
nexus was non-existent and the activity to be regulated was purely local. Thus,
whatever limitation Lopez may have recognized with respect to congressional
power over intrastate activities that may affect commerce, the decision did not
speak to the broad power of Congress to regulate the channels of interstate
commerce, an area occupied by section 2261 as well as numerous other
criminal statutes. 315

Thus the court found that 18 U.S.C. § 2261 was a constitutional exercise
of Congress' power to regulate commerce. 316

B.

Doe v. Doe & 42 US.C. § 13981

In Doe v. Doe, a wife sought damages for deprivation of her federal
right to be free from her husband's alleged gender-based violence against
her. 317 She alleged "that from 1978 until 1995 [her husband] 'systematically and continuously inflicted a violent pattern of physical and
mental abuse and cruelty upon [her],' including throwing her to the
floor, kicking her, throwing sharp and dangerous objects at her,
threatening to kill her, and destroying property belonging to [her]."318
She also alleged that her husband forced her "to be a 'slave' and
perform all manual labor, including maintaining and laying out his
clothes for his numerous dates with his many girlfriends and mistresses. "319
Her husband filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the constitutionality of the civil rights remedy provision of the VAWA, and "claiming
that Congress lacked authority under either the Commerce Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to enact this
statutory scheme recognizing and enforcing a federal civil right to be

314.
452 U.S.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
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Id. at 88 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
264, 276 (1981)).
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free from gender-based violence."320 The husband argued that Lopez
overruled the rationality test for determining whether federal regulation
of interstate conduct can be sustained, and that Congress exceeded its
authority in enacting the VAWA because Lopez was critical of the same
arguments relied on in enacting the VAWA, namely the Government's
"cost of crime" and "national productivity" reasoning. 321
The court disagreed with the husband, stating that Lopez reaffirmed
the rationality test of Hodel, and that "[t]he Congressional findings and
reports qualitatively and quantitatively demonstrate the substantial effect
on interstate commerce of gender-based violence, in marked distinction
to the Gun Free Zone Act challenged in Lopez which lacked such
analysis, only theoretical impact arguments."322 The court rejected the
husband's arguments based on the "cost of crime" and "national
productivity" rationales which were rejected in Lopez, believing the
husband's arguments were "based upon 'selectively relying on Supreme
Court statements plucked from their context. "'323 As such, the court
believed that:
Given the important nature of the conduct sought to be prevented and the
previously-approved private attorney general method of remedy, this court
concludes that the statutory scheme which creates a federal civil rights remedy
for gender-motivated violence is reasonably adapted to an end permitted by the
Constitution. This conclusion is consistent with prior precedent related to other
federal civil rights remedies enacted by Congress and upheld by courts as
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 324

The court thus found that the VAWA was a permissible constitutional
exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, and it
reached this result without considering whether the Fourteenth Amendment also authorized Congress to enact the VAWA. 325

320. Id.
321. Id. at 613.
322. Id.
323. Id. (citing U.S. v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (11th Cir.1995)).
324. Id. at 617 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 under the Commerce Clause); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
243 (1983) (upholding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act under the Commerce
Clause); Pulcinella v. Ridley Township, 822 F. Supp. 204, 211 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Fair
Housing Act); Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 593-95 (D. Me. 1995) (Americans
with Disabilities Act)).
325. Id.

1103

C.

Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University & 42
u.s.c. § 13981

The court in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University 26
went into considerably more detail in analyzing the constitutionality of
the civil rights statute. First, it analyzed the facts of the case in order to
determine whether the rape was motivated by gender animus. The court
found that there were enough factors surrounding the rape indicative of
gender animus; thus a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was
defeated. 327 However, the court closely examined Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 13981 was unconstitutional.
Under the Commerce Clause, the court stated that the statute must
regulate an activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
as in Lopez. The court broke down the Lopez analysis into four parts:
the nature of the regulated activity; an individual case inquiry; the
relevance of legislative history; and the practical implications of
accepting the government's argument that the economic impact of the
regulated activity had sufficient effects on interstate commerce to sustain
the regulation. 328 After examining these four parts, the court then
compared Lopez and found that "[t]he combination of the insignificance
of the differences between the case at hand and Lopez and the significance of the similarities leads to the conclusion that Congress acted
beyond its commerce power in enacting VAWA."329
The court then focused on the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and on Congress' "two ends in mind in drafting VAWA:
(1) to remedy private individuals' gender-based violence and (2) to

326.
327.
328.
329.

935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 786-87.
Id. at 793.
Arguably the following three differences between the case at hand and Lopez
render Lopez's logic inapplicable to the case at hand: (1) that VAWA is civil,
and the Lopez statute was criminal, (2) that there are legislative findings here
but not in Lopez, and (3) that fewer steps of causation exist between the
VAWA regulated activity and commerce than§ 922(q)'s regulated activity and
commerce. The similarities include (1) the criminal nature of both statutes, (2)
the non-commercial nature of both statutes, (3) the lack of a jurisdictional
requirement that some effect on interstate commerce is involved in each case,
(4) the remoteness of any effect on commerce, and (5) the excessive
congressional power that would logically follow from permitting both statutes
based on the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 789.
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remedy gender-based deficiencies in the states' criminal justice
systems."330 The court examined both ends and found neither of them
to be legitimate,331 concluding that:
No reasonable possibility exists that, in enacting VAWA, Congress has enforced
the Fourteenth Amendment mandate that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." No reasonable
possibility exists that VAWA will remedy any legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern. 332

The court acknowledged that "violence against women is a pervasive and
troublesome aspect of American life which needs thoughtful attention. " 333 However, "Congress is not invested with the authority to cure
all of the ills of mankind. Its authority to act is limited by the
Constitution, and the constitutional limits must be respected if our
federal system is to survive."334
DEREK

330.
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332.
333.
334.
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Id. at 797.
Id. at 797-801.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id.
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